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Abstract
This article uses the World Bank's engagement with religious actors to analyse their
differentiated role in setting the development agenda raising three key issues. First,
engagements between international financial institutions (IFIs) and religious actors are
formalised thus excluding many of the actors embedded within communities in the South.
Secondly, the varied politics of religious actors in development are rarely articulated
and a single position is often presented. Thirdly, the potential for development
alternatives from religious actors excluded from these engagements is overlooked, due
in part to misrecognition of the mutually constitutive relationship between secular and
sacral elements in local contexts.

1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades there has been a shift in the way the development agenda is
negotiated and set characterised by the opening of the ‘development space’ to a broader
range of actors, particularly civil society. Critical approaches to this opening have
identified the asymmetries of power between different civil society actors in the one
hand, and between civil society actors and international financial institutions (IFIs) on
the other. This has resulted in the inclusion of civil society actors that adopt existing
development orthodoxy in the development space and the exclusion of those that
challenge this orthodoxy. Within this literature there is an emerging emphasis on the
agency of those actors excluded, and reconstructive critical approaches have highlighted
the potential for alternative development ideas and practices from these actors,
particularly within the South. However this analysis is rarely extended to religious actors
despite growing recognition of the role played by religious actors in development at the
local and national levels in the South and at the international level (Clarke and Jennings,
2008; Haynes, 2007). This article seeks to open a critical research agenda on the
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of religious actors in the development space at the
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international and local levels.1 We argue that analysis of the dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion of civil society actors in the development space needs to be extended to
religious actors and that the potential of these actors for providing development
alternatives and counter-hegemonic agency needs to be given more consideration. We
are particularly concerned with relations between civil society actors and IFIs, as it is
these relations that best exemplify the opening of the development space and the
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. We have chosen the World Bank as a site for
analysis because in recent years it has broadened its development approach to include
civil society actors and has created an explicit space for engaging with religious actors in
development.
In examining these dynamics we make a three-fold argument. First, in both the
literature on religious actors in development and the engagement between IFIs and
religious actors the focus is on formalised religious actors, often referred to as faithbased organisations or FBOs, and as a result informal actors are often overlooked in
negotiating, setting and contesting the development agenda.2 Secondly, the varied
politics of religious actors are rarely articulated. Unlike secular civil society actors,
religious actors tend to be viewed homogenously and separately from other civil society
actors and from the communities in which they are embedded. We contend that religious
actors are deeply involved in both top-down development and in contesting
development; thus a singular form of agency cannot be generalised to all religious actors
involved in development. Thirdly, underpinning both of these limitations is a lack of
consideration for the mutually constitutive relationship between secular and sacral3
elements at the local level and increasingly at the international level. This relationship
1

We use the term ‘local’ to refer to political and social spaces existing at the sub-national level within
nation-states as defined by the peoples that constitute said spaces. Such a space can be limited in size and
scale, such as a particular community centred on a village or number of villages or an urban locality. Local
can also refer to a political and social space extending across provinces, federal states, autonomous regions
or other sub-national units. Local can also refer to a non-territorial political and social space within which
development, civil society actors, and religious actors are embedded such as among particular ethnic
groups, indigenous communities, and class and caste groups. Local in not used as a substitute for
‘national’, especially when being analysed in comparison to ‘international’.
2
We use the term ‘religious actors’ rather than faith-based organisations when recognising both formal
and informal actors associated with religious organisations and communities
3
We adopt Haynes’ three-fold definition of religion as ‘to do with: the idea of transcendence, that is, it
relates to supernatural realities; with sacredness, that is, as a system of language and practice that
organizes the world in terms of what is deemed holy; and with ultimacy, that is, it relates people to the
ultimate conditions of existence.’ (2006, p.223) These attributes constitute what we have called ‘sacral’
elements that exist in the spaces of development.
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shapes the way the development agenda is negotiated, set, and contested in different
locations and must be considered in research on the role of religion in development and
in the practice of development in the field, particularly in the context of ongoing
engagement between religious actors and IFIs and between secular and religious civil
society actors.
At the outset it is important to make two disclaimers. First, we are not advocating
that religion holds the solution to deficiencies in the development agenda at the
international, national, or local levels. Nor are we suggesting that religious actors, by
definition, are more capable of providing development alternatives. We adopt an open
critical perspective on religion in development, analysing the different forms it takes and
the different contributions it makes to development whether positive, negative, and/or
ambiguous. Secondly, we are not suggesting that religion be simply grafted onto existing
ways of understanding or practicing development. We do not wish to ‘add’ religion to
what is already known about development, rather we are analysing religion because it is
a primary element in most of the locations where development interventions take place.
Religion exists in the lives of those subject to the policies derived from development
agendas and in the lives of those formulating such policies. Yet critical discussions of
the role of religious actors in development have often overlooked many of the ways that
religious actors contribute to improving people’s lives.
This article begins by discussing the opening of the development space to civil
society, including religious actors. While the opening of the development space has
altered the relationship between states, international development agencies, and civil
society, the focus of this article is restricted to the enhanced role for civil society actors
in their dealings with IFIs. The second section uses existing literature to analyse the
critical reading of this opening and presents a typology of civil society actors included
in, and excluded from, the development space. The third section applies this critical
reading to religious actors using the example of the World Bank and its engagement with
religious actors. The fourth section builds upon the case study to infer upon the way IFIs
such as the World Bank favour formalised organisations and exclude other religious
actors. The final section assesses the shortcomings of the dominant critical approach in
identifying these dynamics and suggests further directions in research before the article
concludes.
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2 OPENING THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The development agenda refers here to the issues defined as ‘problems’ and the
solutions proposed to alleviate or at least reduce the impacts of these problems. Setting
the development agenda involves gathering knowledge about conditions in the South,
which of these conditions require intervention, which agencies will intervene, who will
be partners in these interventions, and the policies to guide these interventions. Since the
early 1990s the actors involved in negotiating and setting the development agenda and
implementing development projects have broadened significantly. The political space for
negotiating and setting the development agenda, termed the ‘development space’ here,
has been opened to a range of actors from academics to professional practitioners,
planners to think-tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to representatives from
transnational corporations. This enables these actors to participate in the process of
defining development priorities, formulating suitable polices, and implementing these
policies.
Given the opening of the development space, the question of ‘who sets the
development agenda?’ has become crucial for critical scholars. It has been argued that
knowledge underpins the setting of the development agenda and is concentrated in IFIs,
particularly the World Bank and regional development banks, as well as influential
bilateral aid donors. Since the shift away from state-led development towards market-led
development in the 1970s the power of IFIs has increased as they control both
knowledge to set development priorities and material capacity to implement them (Bøås
and McNeill, 2004, pp. 3-6). The development agenda espoused by IFIs came under
heavy criticism throughout the 1980s and 1990s and the response of IFIs has been
refereed to as a ‘new kind of synthesis’ that moves away from strict neoliberal doctrine
and reconsiders the role of the state, the need for good governance, and the impacts of
market-led adjustments on furthering poverty (Öniş and Şenses, 2005, p. 273). This has
been a complex process involving multiple actors and the set of ideas emerging from
this process remain heavily contested. However, one clear and significant outcome of
this process is that IFIs have opened a space for other actors to negotiate and set the
development agenda (Guttal, 2006, p. 27). More than any other actors, the opening of
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the development space has led to a greater role for civil society in setting, negotiating,
and implementing development priorities (Carbone and Lister, 2006, p. 7).
While definitions of civil society vary most theorists refer to a ‘sphere’ of
political and social activity that is separate from the state and the market and to the
actors that operate within this sphere (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 18; Kaldor, 2003;
Scholte, 2002). Used in this way civil society encompasses a range of actors, including
social movements, community organisations, political parties, trade unions, though the
term is increasingly being used to refer simply to NGOs, particularly in discussions of
development (Amoore and Langley, 2004, p. 91). At the international, national, and
local levels IFIs and bilateral aid donors are viewing civil society as a means of
legitimising development programs by engaging civil society actors as partners
(Edwards, 1999; Harrison, 2007; Henry et al, 2004; Hudson, 2001). This has been
particularly evident since the World Bank introduced ‘good governance’ and fostering
of ‘social capital’ as a major part of its funding conditions (Harriss, 2001/2004;
McNeill, 2004) and since the adoption of a policy discourse that advocates
‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ by IFIs and bilateral donors (Cornwall and Brock,
2006). Additionally, recent scholarship has focussed on the inclusion of religious actors
within civil society their increasing visibility in development (Benedetti, 2006; Clarke,
2006).

3 ‘NEW SYNTHESIS’ OR TOP-DOWN HEGEMONY?
Far from seeing this as the beginning of a more inclusive and participatory development
agenda, critical scholarship has drawn attention to the complicity of civil society actors
in reproducing the top-down development agenda. The aim of critical theory is to
examine the existing order and question how that order has been formed, and then focus
on the ways that the order may be transformed (Cox, 1981/1996, pp. 89-90). Cox made
the distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory. Unlike problem
solving theory which seeks to explain events using existing structures and actors, a
critical approach does not take institutions or social and power relations as natural or
given, rather critical theory seeks to explore their origins and assess whether they are in
the process of changing (1981/1996, pp. 97-9). Critical approaches explore the potential
for alternatives and encourage struggles to achieve such ends (Linklater, 1992, p. 79).
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Critical approaches to development seek to deconstruct and examine the material and
ideational power relations that underpin development orthodoxy, yet they also seek to
reconstruct alternatives to that orthodoxy (Matthews, 2004, p. 373), and thus questions
of inclusion and exclusion form an important element of critical approaches.
Critical analysts of the opening of the development space have concluded that
far from signifying any substantial change in development thinking or practice, the ‘new
synthesis’ demonstrates the hegemony of the international development establishment,
particularly IFIs (Guttal, 2006; Girvan, 2006; Ocampo, 2002; Taylor, 2004). According
to this perspective the opening of the development space to civil society provides
limited opportunities and effectively coopts oppositional actors, particularly through
working and funding partnerships between civil society actors and operational agencies.
In short, IFIs and other donors fund civil society actors that will not challenge the
programs being implemented, will not destabilise local society, and will legitimise the
programs by agreeing to be local partners in a subordinate position (Huddock, 1999;
Lewis, 2001). Thus it has been argued that the relationship between civil society and
IFIs and other donors has shifted from an oppositional to a co-operative dynamic
(Utting, 2006). This leaves actors attempting to challenge or change the development
agenda marginalised in favour of actors supportive of the status quo.
Chandhoke argues that civil society actors favoured in development are wellestablished NGOs headed by experts and professionals from the North, or citizens of the
South trained in the North, and although some of these NGOs may form partnerships
with smaller community-based actors these relations are characterised by ‘infinite
dependence’ (2003, p. 76). This leads her to question ‘whose political agendas do these
NGOs advance when they intervene in crucial areas of collective life?’ (2003, p. 72) A
range of empirical studies support Chandhoke’s argument; including studies from Latin
America (Grugel, 2000), Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Michael, 2004), Sri Lanka
(Goonatilake, 2006), Bangladesh (Feldman, 2003), and East Timor (Brunnstrom, 2003).
Furthermore it has been demonstrated that in certain locations where formalised NGOs
did not already exist they have been created by governments in order to access
international funding and fulfil IFI conditions (Obadare, 2005; Vasavakul, 2003).
Therefore while access to the development space may have increased for civil
society the space is dominated by professional, formal, and compliant actors. Civil
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society actors granted access to the development space must curb any radical or
transformative inclinations to continue to receive access and funding. Restrictions are
even more pronounced for civil society actors in the South as they compete with each
other for grants and partnerships with Northern NGOs, IFIs, and bilateral donors. This
does not necessarily mean that civil society actors granted access to the development
space have had no influence or are less legitimate representatives than those excluded.
Indeed, the opening of the development space is an improvement on decades of
exclusion for virtually all civil society actors. However, the asymmetries of power
apparent in the opening of the development space can curtail and control the level of
influence of those granted access and limit the types of actors granted access in the first
instance. In this process a potentially vast source of alternative ideas and practices is
also lost.
In addressing the question of ‘which civil society actors are granted access to the
development space?’ three broad types of civil society actors emerge from the critical
literature. The first are formalised civil society organisations based in the North that
have access to institutions where the development agenda is set and negotiated,
particularly IFIs and United Nations agencies. They implement development priorities
in the South, often in partnerships with local organisations, and their professional
development expertise gives them disproportionate power over their Southern partners.
The need to implement programs funded by IFIs and other international donors limits
their transformative potential making them likely to reproduce the development agenda
(Murphy, 2005). The second are formalised civil society organisations from the South
that work in partnership with Northern organisations, IFIs, and often their own national
governments. In order to be chosen to work in partnerships these organisations must
relinquish their autonomy and ensure that their approach to development reflects that of
their financiers and Northern partners. Despite being staffed by and often headed by
nationals from the country in question, professional requirements mean that the staff are
generally drawn from the social and political elite, limiting their understating of
development needs of people from other class and ethnic groups, and ensuring they have
an embedded interest in maintaining the broader status quo (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007;
Mohan, 2002, p. 133; Townsend et al, 2002; Ulvila and Hossain, 2002). The third are
local civil society actors that are more deeply involved in communities at the grassroots.
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The types of civil society actors funded through IFIs and operational agencies are
generally those more able to present themselves as more professionalised which
potentially marginalises smaller and less professionalised actors. Some of these actors
may have a deeper understanding of local development needs, though this is not
necessarily a given. As distinct from the second type of actors above, they have limited
access to the development space and to funds and partnerships whether international or
national (Amoore and Langley, 2004, p. 99). This third type of actor includes formalised
NGOs and philanthropic groups, but also more informal social movements, community
groups, networks of activists, and collectives. In much of the literature these actors are
perceived as having a better understanding of development needs, have more sustainable
solutions to development problems, and are able to utilise knowledge that is otherwise
marginalised by Northern expertise. Though still relatively powerless against the topdown, professionalised, development establishment (White, 1996) they are perceived to
provide the best hope for alternative development approaches. It should be noted that
this perception has also been accused of reifying and romanticising the grassroots,
glossing over inequalities and homogenising communities (Agrawal and
Sivaramakrishnan, 2001, p. 12).
While both the critical approach to the opening of the development space and the
differentiation between types of civil society actors are welcome, the critical approach
stops short of fully engaging with religious actors. While there has been a surge of
literature on the role of religion in development over the last decade, critical scholars
have contributed little to these discussions. We begin to address this shortcoming by
examining the role of religious actors in negotiating, setting, and most crucially
contesting the development agenda.

4 FAITH AND ETHICS AGENDA AT THE WORLD BANK
As the study of world politics grapples with the question of secularism and its
alternatives (Berger, 1999; Casanova, 1994; Esposito and Watson, 2000; Fox and
Sandler, 2006; Hurd, 2008; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Thomas, 2005) there is an
increasing awareness that religious actors are prominent in vast numbers of communities
in the South. As a World Bank working paper recently acknowledged, ‘religion is a
central part of the international system…even if it wished to do so, the Bank could not
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entirely sidestep the faith engagement’ (World Bank, 2006, p.3). An emerging body of
literature is concerned with the relationships between religion and development (Clarke
and Jennings, 2008; Eade, 2002; Harcourt, 2003; Marshall and Keough, 2005; Marshall
and Van Saanen, 2007; Thomas 2004). This section considers the role of religious actors
in the opening of the development space. The question ‘who sets the development
agenda?’ needs to be extended via two additional questions: ‘what role do religious
actors play in setting the development agenda?’ and ‘which religious actors are included
and which are excluded?’
As noted above, IFIs such as the World Bank play a central role in setting the
international development agenda. A critical reading of the faiths and development
program of the World Bank provides an insight into the place of religion in this process.
There are least three external and three internal factors that helped reposition the World
Bank on the question of religion. These elements emerged in the same context as the
opening of the development space in the 1980s and 1990s. First, highly effective NGO
advocacy against World Bank environmental policy in the mid-1980s included religious
advocacy groups which instigated the direct engagement with religious actors (Pallas,
2005, p. 678). In addition, a coalition of advocacy groups on environmental issues called
the Alliance for Religion and Conservation (ARC) emerged in the mid-1980s and was
formalised as an NGO in 1995 (Palmer and Finlay, 2003, p. xv). In 1997 the ARC
network facilitated the first high-level linkages between the World Bank and religious
leaders (ARC, 2008). Secondly, religious advocacy on debt in the South via the Jubilee
2000 campaign influenced the policy priorities of in-coming World Bank President
James Wolfensohn on the issue of highly indebted countries (Marshall and Keough,
2004, p. 44; Valley, 1990). Faith-based advocacy on debt relief and human rights
subsequently became mainstreamed in influential policy networks, notably in the UK
and the US, and has continued to be a prominent part of the international development
agenda (Busby, 2007; Clarke, 2007). Thirdly, policy developments on religion in other
international organisations such as the United Nations, Inter-American Development
Bank, World Health Organisation and the International Labour Organisation influenced
the World Bank’s approach (Peccoud, 2004; Thomas, 2005, pp. 225-226; World Bank,
2006, p. 6). The Bank has documented a raft of other linkages between religious actors
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and development institutions (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007; Marshall and Keough,
2005; Marshall and Keough, 2004; Marshall and Marsh, 2003; Belshaw et al., 2001).
There are also three internal processes important for understanding the increasing
interest in religion within the World Bank. First, an informal staff forum called the
Friday Morning Group explicitly linked religion to a ‘values’ discussion at the Bank, and
contributed to the institution’s move beyond a structural adjustment ethos (Beckmann et
al., 1991). David Beckmann, who helped found the group in 1981, warned the institution
in 1983 that ‘the Bank’s activities have become markedly less focused on reducing
poverty’ (Kapur et al., 1997, p. 349; Thomas, 2005, pp. 225-226). Secondly, World
Bank President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) was personally determined to bring religion
into the Bank’s operations (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007, pp. 5-8) despite the
Executive Board voting in 2001 to reject Wolfensohn’s proposal to establish a small
‘Directorate on Faith’ by 24 votes to zero (Wolfensohn, 2004, pp. 21-22; Tyndale, 2003,
p. 25; see also Clarke, 2007).4 The program survived as a specialised unit within the
External Affairs Vice-Presidency to be funded by the discretionary President’s
Contingency Fund and the Development Dialogue for Values and Ethics was established
to operationalise World Bank partnerships with religious actors (World Bank, 2006).
Thirdly, the survey Voices of the Poor, commissioned to inform the World Development
Report 2000-2001, revealed that among the sixty thousand poor women and men
surveyed, ‘churches and mosques, as well as sacred trees, rivers, and mountains’ were
highly valued among the poor who were also aware of the detrimental effects of actions
by religious actors on the development of their communities (Narayan, 2001, pp. 45-46).
The priority to engage ‘religion’ was thus embedded within the Bank’s own knowledge
expertise.
The external and internal factors above describe ways in which religion entered
the policy discourse, networks and institutional framework of perhaps the most
influential actor involved in setting the international development agenda. Added to
these are broader imperatives demanded by the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New
4

Various explanations of this vote have been offered. Wolfensohn situates the problem with state
stakeholders at the WB: ‘national governments do not give homes to faith-based organisations typically in
their own administrative set-ups, and they’re just not prepared to let us do it.’ (Wolfensohn, 2004, pp. 2122); Tyndale (2003, p. 25) posits a ‘link between religious groups and political conflicts in many parts of
world’; Clarke (2007) suggests ‘concern about the erosion of church-state boundaries in the USA and its
potential spill-over into US policy on international development’.
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York and Washington. The World Bank example demonstrates the ways that religious
actors are included in the process of negotiating and setting the development agenda.
The following section frames this process of inclusion against some important
exclusionary dynamics.

5 EXCLUDING RELIGION FROM ABOVE
As previously discussed, critical approaches to the role of civil society in development
discuss three broad types of civil society actors as a way of identifying asymmetrical
relations of power. When applied to religious actors involved in development this
approach reveals important differences in the status of religious actors and the potential
for exclusion from the development space of particular types of religious actors. We
illustrate this by classifying religious actors associated with the World Bank using the
typology of civil society actors constructed above. Groups have been selected because
they meet one of three criteria: they have entered into formal partnerships with the
World Bank, have been involved in specific dialogues with the World Bank on
development issues, or have been identified as prospective development partners by the
World Bank. The differentiation of these actors according to the critical development
typology is demonstrated in Table 1.
[insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 is not designed to critique the relative contributions of listed organisations, but
to indicate the relative position and type of religious actors in relation to the World
Bank. This highlights three characteristics of the World Bank’s faith and development
agenda. The first is a priority toward formalised organisations. This is to be expected
given that the institutional requirements of the World Bank favour partnerships of formal
activities and reporting and that the requirements binding the World Bank’s ideology for
faith and development partnerships lies in a benchmarking activity measured by the
Millennium Development Goals (Marshall and Marsh, 2003). The second is that
engagements with religious actors categorised above as informal are more problematic
for the Bank. For example, the Guatemalan Inter-religious Dialogue on Development
(DIRGD) revealed a ‘glaring lack of documentation, understanding and use of the rich
store of knowledge, work and ideas of faith institutions in development realms’
(Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 88). The Ethiopian Interfaith Forum for Development
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Dialogue and Action (EIFDDA) was, in turn, hindered by an inability to engage
constructively with the economic framework of the World Bank’s poverty reduction
strategy and its lack of formalised membership resulted in a lack of ‘clear strategic
direction’ (Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 92). Thirdly, the mechanism used to include
informal faith-based programs in the World Bank program was the World Faiths
Development Dialogue (WFDD). Though described as an ‘independent NGO’ the
WFDD was from its inception dependent upon directives from the Development
Dialogue team at the World Bank. Despite its commitment to deep engagements with
religious communities, the WFDD experienced difficulties ‘especially over how WFDD
is perceived by faith communities critical of the World Bank, IMF…and G7/8’ (Taylor
et al., 2003, p. 2). In 2005 it was placed ‘in hibernation awaiting decisions by its trustees
and partners (notably the World Bank)’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 1, fn.1). Yet significantly,
from its own inception the Development Dialogue was virtually ignored at the executive
levels of the World Bank (World Bank, 2006, pp. 1,4) and its eventual inclusion in the
Human Development Anchor is described as philosophically and instrumentally
unsuccessful (World Bank, 2006, p. 4).
From this brief example we identify three factors that demonstrate the value of a
critical reading of religion in the development space. The first is that formalised
religious organisations seem to have a different capacity than informal religious groups
and communities in relations with IFIs as they have access to the political spaces where
the international development agenda is negotiated and set. This is not to suggest that
such groups cannot challenge the development agenda. The peace-making record of the
Community of Sant’Egidio and the advocacy potential of the newly formed WFDA are
both examples of this. Yet of equal significance are the limitations that formality places
on contesting dominant ideas and practices. This is particularly important for analysing
religious actors in development because religio-cultural dynamics are more deeply
rooted in communities than organisations (Thomas, 2004), suggesting a divergence
between the types of actors included in the development space and the types of actors
embedded in communities, especially in the South. Thus, from a World Bank
perspective the informal engagements described in Table 1 are attributed with a lesser
status as ‘guideposts’ when compared to partnerships with formal organisations which
are considered as models (Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 87). This may be due to the
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embryonic nature of initiatives, but also because they constitute attempts by informal
networks of religious actors embedded in communities to engage in grassroots
transformative partnerships (see Tyndale, 2006).
Secondly, formal institutional organs designed to enrich faith and development
partnerships at the grass-roots level within and outside the World Bank are themselves
marginalised from centralised development processes. For instance the WFDD and the
Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values have both struggled for legitimacy and
funding. If central bodies such as these are ineffective, it is more than reasonable to
suggest a large number of informal religious actors operating at the local level in the
South remain completely excluded from the so-called rise of religion in development at
the international level. In this sense the World Bank is an arena of contestation where
religious development priorities can be coopted and marginalised.
Thirdly the dynamics of including and excluding religious actors homogenises
religion and coopts it into the knowledge base of IFIs, further limiting the potential for
development alternatives from religious actors. Clarke has usefully categorised FBOs
into five types: apex bodies, charitable/development organisations, socio-political
organisations, missionary organisations, and illegal or terrorist organisations (2008: 2432). Combining Clarke’s categories and our critical development typology, World Bank
engagements with FBOs described above seem to homogenise religion around apex
bodies and development organisations over socio-political organisations whose activities
might fall outside the priorities of the development agenda. Yet it is also noteworthy that
Clarke’s FBO typology is based on degrees of formality, and informal development
activities grounded in religious communities remain excluded from the analysis. The
inclusion of religious actors in the development space requires an accommodation of
both socio-political advocacy groups and informal associations and networks.
These factors illustrate the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion toward religious
civil society actors by IFIs and within international development more broadly. The
exclusion of informal religious actors embedded in communities in the South, in turn,
excludes many of the possibilities of transformative change and development
alternatives. Thus only a limited number of voices emerge from the religious ‘sector’ in
development. A critical reading of religious actors differentiates between the types of
actors included in the development space and those that are excluded and examines the
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limitations on their ability to negotiate and set the development agenda. We also begin to
see the asymmetries of power between IFIs and religious actors, between different types
of religious actors, and even within IFIs. Yet it is here that the critical approach to
religious actors in development tends to stop short. For critical research aimed at altering
asymmetrical relations of power within the development agenda, the challenge exists to
broaden analysis of civil society actors to include organisational and community-based
dynamics of religion within its own critique. Beyond the boundaries of the development
agenda, the possibility of religion as a deep resource for contesting development
orthodoxy and providing alternatives is poorly conceptualised and often ignored.

6 EXCLUDING RELIGION FROM BELOW
Whilst the critical view highlights the exclusion of informal religious actors from above,
critical approaches operate with a limited view of religion from below. This undermines
critiques of inclusion and exclusion of religious actors in the development space.5 This
excludes two important dynamics of religion in development. First, critical approaches
overlook the role of religion in the material contestations of development. The
importance of materialist concerns in the critical tradition is matched by a suspicion of
the transcendent ideologies of religion that are seen to undermine the immanent and
situated needs of the poor. We challenge oppositional binaries between material/secular
and spiritual/religious concerns, and argue that it is misleading to conclude that the
materialist ontology of the critical traditional is incompatible with religious agency (Fox
and Sandler, 2006, p. 170).
A prime example of critical development ideology and practice by religious
actors is the liberation theology movements that flourished in Central and South
America between the 1960s and 1990s. Not unlike critical approaches more generally,
liberation theologies have passed through forms of ‘leftist fundamentalism’ toward ‘a
more complex reading’ of power and development (Miguez, 2006, p. 125). Liberation
theology is rooted in a praxis-based epistemology (Bennett, 2007). It is grounded in
theological and political advocacy for the poor (Boff and Boff, 1987, pp. 1-10; Bonino,
1975) and in Freire’s ideology of conscientization (Berryman, 1987, pp. 34-38). It also
incorporates both materialist and indigenous re-readings of religious tradition (Belo,
5

Additionally this limitation could be extended to critical considerations of exclusion from below in civil
society more generally, though this is beyond the scope of this article.

15

1981; Brown, 1984; Miguez, 2006, pp. 122-125; Miranda, 1974). Liberation theologies
construct frameworks for action where immanent (liberationist) and transcendent
(salvationist) ideals are employed to advocate for those who are ‘are totally outside the
system’ and who suffer the ‘idolatry of the market’, ‘exclusion’ and commodification
(Miguez, 2006, p. 129).
In his seminal work, A Theology of Liberation, Gutierrez set the cause of
liberation for ‘oppressed peoples and social classes’ by critiquing developmentalist
(desarrollista) orthodoxy and infusing religious elements into alternative development
conceptions (1973, pp. 21-42). For Gutierrez, it was within a ‘radical perspective of
liberation’ – grounded in the situated faiths and communities of the poor – that
development ‘finds its true meaning and possibilities of accomplishing something
worthwhile’ (1973, p. 36). Such peoples are overwhelmingly religious in outlook, and
this impacts directly on how development is perceived. In the contemporary context
similar movements have been identified in Korea (Suh, 1991), Malawi (Mitchell, 2002),
Senegal (Galvan, 2004), Cambodia (Poethig, 2002) and Thailand (Darlington, 1998) to
name a small sample. They represent important expressions of a critical re-reading of
culture by religious actors and a core dimension of the ‘global struggle for authenticity’
in development emanating from the South (Thomas, 2000, p.818; Haynes, 1994, pp. 1843).
The second issue excluded by critical approaches is the potential for counterhegemonic agency by religious traditions. The recent inclusion of religion in setting the
development agenda can be read as an expression of the hegemony of Northern interests
(Clarke, 2008, pp. 18-21). Indeed, aspects of the critical reading of the World Bank’s
faiths and development agenda above encourage such an observation. Yet we argue that
this is not a sufficient point upon which to rest. Religious traditions are best understood
as ambivalent (Appleby, 2000, pp. 288-301; Haynes, 2007, pp. 53-74). In practice this
means that religious actors offer both limitations to alternative development ideas and
practices but also the potential to articulate and gain support for such alternatives.
Critical approaches must understand this to more fully account for counter-hegemonic
activity taking place in the South. Further research needs to be directed towards actors
excluded from the development agenda and their agency needs to be re-evaluated. There
are numerous examples of this ranging from the role of religious actors in anti-dam
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movements in Brazil (Rothman and Oliver, 2002), opposition to mining in the
Philippines (Holden and Jacobsen, 2007), and promoting neglected aspects of
development such as health (Farmer, 2005), water and other basic needs (Patterson,
2007), which can explicitly or implicitly critique dominant development priorities and
practices.
Religion and religious actors are embedded in social and political worlds in the
South that make them difficult to ‘see’ and measure using conventional analysis of
formalised organisations. However, given the importance of religious agency it is
imperative that critical theorists not exclude religion from counter-hegemonic praxis.
Studies of religious actors in counter-hegemonic movements tend to escape this dilemma
by name swapping. For example, religious groups become ‘community groups’,
‘grassroots organisations’, or part of ‘social movements’ when they challenge the
hegemony of the development agenda whereas they remain ‘religious’ when they are
associated with dominant ideas and practices. We argue for a new categorisation of
religious actors. Agency, whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, cannot clearly be
attributed to either sacral or secular structures, ideas, or worldviews. At the local level
the secular and sacral are mutually constitutive (Asad, 2003, pp. 21-66; Marty, 2003).
Rather than simply adding religion to the critical secular frameworks of the past,
new research initiatives that take religion seriously need to be resituated within a
secular-sacral conception of the spaces of development, and founded in an ambivalent
notion of religion. Unless this can be achieved, critical approaches to development will
continue to exclude core elements of religion that, in turn, will undermine its ability to
critique the development agenda and the cooption of civil society. It is a particular
challenge for critical scholars from the North who are susceptible to ‘speak about Third
World societies in terms…that, as it were, socially homogenised the poverty of those
societies’ (Kitching, 2001, p. 302). By contrast, Nandy’s perspective usefully
differentiates religion as ‘ideology’ and religion as ‘faith’. Religion as ideology takes the
form of a ‘sub-national, national or cross-national identifier of populations contesting for
or protecting non-religious, usually political or socioeconomic, interests’ (Nandy, 2002,
pp. 61-62). This is contrasted by, and in conflict with, the concept of faith as ‘religion as
a way of life, a tradition which is definitely non-monolithic and operationally plural’
(Nandy, 2002, p. 62). For Nandy, in differentiating the ‘two axis on

17

which…contemporary religions can be plotted’ the state ‘always prefers to deal with
religious ideologies rather than with faiths’ (2002, pp. 63-4). We suggest the same with
regards to IFIs and the cooption of formal religious actors into the development agenda.

7 CONCLUSION
We have introduced the issues above with the intention of provoking further critical
inquiry into the role of religion in negotiating, setting, and contesting the development
agenda. Critical approaches to the opening of the development space, and particularly
the role of civil society, are helpful in identifying the asymmetries of power between
IFIs and civil society actors and within civil society itself. The dynamics of inclusion
and exclusion in the development space are crucial for analysing the hegemony of the
international development agenda and the potential for counter-hegemonic agency. We
argue that these relations are thoughtfully and effectively articulated in critical
approaches toward civil society in development. However, we suggest that the critical
approach has not been extended to religious actors despite their influence in
communities in the South. By drawing on the exclusion of religious actors from above
and from below we have argued that religious actors are subject to a limited engagement
that overlooks their role in reproducing hegemonic relations and holding counterhegemonic potential in the development space to generate alternatives. Understanding
the mutually constitutive relationship between secular and sacral elements of the social
world will, in turn, enable critical theorists to differentiate the effects of religious civil
society actors at the international and local levels.
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Table 1. Classifying religious actors linked to the World Bank within a critical
development typology of civil society actors
Formal organisations in the
North: Setting the
Development Agenda

Formal organisations in the
South: Access to the
Development Agenda

Informal actors in the
South: Limited Access to
the Development Agenda

¤ World Vision
¤# World Faiths Development
Dialogue (WFDD)
# World Council of Churches
# Spirit of Fes Foundation
# Women, Faith and
Development Alliance
(WFDA)

# Community of Sant’Egidio

^ Guatemalan Interreligious Dialogue on
Development (DIRGD)

* Delegates of World

* Council of Anglican
Provinces of Africa
* Sarvodaya Movement
* Vikram Sarabhai
Foundation

^ Ethiopian Interfaith
Forum for Development
Dialogue and Action
(EIFDDA)
^ Interfaith health sector
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Religions

* Aga Khan Foundation

+ Alliance for Religions and
Conservation
+ Religions for Peace
+ World Parliament of
Religions
+ United Religions Initiative,
+ 3iG Int’l Interfaith
Investment Group
+ Pontifical Counsel on Justice
and Peace

+ AVENA

dialogue (Tanzania)

Key
¤ Civil Society program partners
# Partnerships established via the Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values
* Dialogue and research partners in development
+ Partnerships proposed by the World Bank working paper (2006)
^ Community development dialogues facilitated for the World Bank by the WFDD
Sources
World Bank Civil Society Program; World Bank Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values;
Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007; World Bank, 2006; Marshall and Keough, 2004; Palmer and Finlay,
2003; Belshaw et al., 2001.
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